"In war, in some sense, lies the very genius of law. It is law creative and active, it is the first principle of law. What is human warfare but just this, an effort to make the laws of God and nature takes sides with one party?" -Henry David Thoreau'
I. Introduction
Alfred Nobel was a Swedish scientist and inventor with a keen interest in chemical engineering. He perfected a method to stabilize the unpredictable liquid explosive, nitroglycerine, and he developed and patented dynamite, a widely used and commercially successful explosive that made him wealthy by the age of forty.
2 During the latter part of his life, Nobel worked on developing weapons-rockets, cannons, and explosives-that he believed could make war so horrific that it would be unthinkable to resort to armed conflict. Influenced in part by his long friendship with international peace advocate Austrian Countess Bertha von Suttner, Nobel developed an interest in efforts to encourage peace. His last will and testament left the bulk of his considerable estate to a fund created for the purpose of awarding prizes to the persons or groups making the most significant contributions to society -in five categories, including for "the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies, and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses." This prestigious award is the Nobel Peace Prize.
On October 9, 2009, the Nobel Committee announced that it had selected United States President Barack Obama as the recipient of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for his "extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a better future. His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world's population. 6 President Obama traveled to Oslo, Norway, and on December 10, 2009, he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize. He delivered a speech at the award ceremony entitled, "A Just and Lasting Peace." In it, he said:
War, in one form or another, appeared with the first man. At the dawn of history, its morality was not questioned; it was simply a fact, like drought or disease-the manner in which tribes and then civilizations sought power and settled their differences. And over time, as codes of law sought to control violence within groups, so did philosophers and clerics and statesmen seek to regulate the destructive power of war. The concept of a "just war" emerged, suggesting that war is justified only when certain conditions were met: if it is waged as a last resort or in selfdefense; if the force used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence .... Let me make one final point about the use of force. Even as we make difficult decisions about going to war, we must also think clearly about how we fight it. The Nobel Committee recognized this truth in awarding its first prize for peace to Henry Dunant-the founder of the Red Cross, and a driving force behind the Geneva Conventions.
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is a source of our strength. That is why I prohibited torture. That is why I ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed. And that is why I have reaffirmed America's commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions. We lose ourselves when we compromise the very ideals that we fight to defend. And we honor-we honor those ideals by upholding them not when it's easy, but when it is hard. 7 Has the United States lived up to the ideals that President Obama passionately argued the nation fights to defend? Some contend that his laudable commitment rests more on rhetoric than reality, and in the eyes of the world at least its foundations appear to have eroded in recent years.! Former President and 2002 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Jimmy Carter, in an article published in the New York Times in June 2012, said the United States is "abandoning its role as the global champion of human rights," citing as examples policies that permit targeted assassinations, indefinite detention without trial at Guantanamo Bay, and warrantless wiretapping. 9 Just two and a half years after President Obama accepted the Nobel Peace Prize and delivered his stirring speech, former President Carter warned:
At a time when popular revolutions are sweeping the globe, the United States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic rules of law and principles of justice enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But instead of making the world safer, America's violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friends.
As concerned citizens, we must persuade Washington to reverse course and regain moral leadership according to international human rights norms that we had officially adopted as our own and cherished throughout the years.' 0 This article examines the development and the objectives of modem international humanitarian law, particularly the principle of distinction intended to limit the effects of war on those not directly involved in the conflict. It looks at actions the United States took after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 , that undermine the foundations upon which international humanitarian law rests." It also looks at how these actions weaken the legal and moral authority of the United States and casts doubt upon its claim to be securely bound to the highest standards of conduct in times of war.12
War is hell. The law of war tries to make it a little less hellish.' 3

II. International Humanitarian Law Before 9/11
A. Law and War: The Effort to Contain the Effects of Warfare
To some, the notion that the constraints imposed by laws are expected to apply during the chaos and carnage of war seems patently irrational.
4 A logical argument can be made that if two sides have reached a point where they are compelled to take up arms in an effort to force the other to capitulate, then they should employ all the means at their disposal in order to prevail. 10 
Id.
I See id 12 See Resorting to total war-the any means necessary approach-in the pursuit of victory or to exact retribution has been the case at times. General William Tecumseh Sherman is remembered for his scorched earth campaign across the American South in the latter part of the Civil War, which played a role in compelling General Robert E. Lee and his Confederate Army to surrender." After the siege and capture of Atlanta in the summer of 1864, Sherman's forces marched across the Georgia heartland to Savannah before turning north towards Columbia and into the Carolinas. Along the way, his troops burned fields, farms, and factories; pillaged food and anything of value they could find; and took horses, mules and wagons from the farmers and townspeople they encountered. 6 General Sherman's name still evokes disdain in some of the areas his troops plundered a century and a half ago.
At the same time Sherman was laying siege to Atlanta in the summer of 1864, representatives from sixteen nations were assembled at a diplomatic conference in Geneva, Switzerland, where they drafted and signed the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field." The conference and the convention that it produced were in large part due to the efforts of one man: Henry Dunant.
B. Henry Dunant
Henry Dunant was born into a prominent family in Geneva in 1828. He was active in a number of religious and charitable movements, co-founded the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) of Geneva in 1852, and helped transform the YMCA into an international organization in 1855." On a business trip to Italy in 1859, Dunant happened to be nearby when Emperor Napoleon and King Victor Emanuel II led the 150,000 men of the Here is a hand-to-hand struggle in all its horror and frightfulness; Austrians and Allies trampling each other under foot, killing one another on piles of bleeding corpses, felling their enemies with their rifle butts, crushing skulls, ripping bellies open with sabre and bayonet. No quarter is given; it is a sheer butchery; a struggle between savage beasts, maddened with blood and fury. Even the wounded fight to the last gasp. When they have no weapon left, they seize their enemies by the throat and tear them with their teeth.
A little further on, it is the same picture, only made the more ghastly by the approach of a squadron of cavalry, which gallops by, crushing dead and dying beneath its horses' hoofs. One poor wounded man has his jaw carried away; another his head shattered; a third, who could have been saved, has his chest beaten in. Oaths and shrieks of rage, groans of anguish and despair, mingle with the whinnying of horses.
Here come the artillery, following the cavalry, and going at full gallop. The guns crash over the dead and wounded, strewn pell-mell on the ground. Brains spurt under the wheels, limbs are broken and torn, bodies mutilated past recognition-the soil is literally puddled with blood, and the plain littered with human 20 remains. What made the greatest impression on Dunant was not the ferocity of the battle itself, but the tremendous suffering that remained after the fighting had ended.
The stillness of the night was broken by groans, by stifled sighs of anguish and suffering. Heart-rending voices kept calling for help. Who could ever describe the agonies of that fearful night! When the sun came up on the twenty-fifth, it disclosed the most dreadful sights imaginable. Bodies of men and horses covered the battlefield; corpses were strewn over roads, ditches, ravines, thickets and fields; the approaches of Solferino were literally thick with dead. The fields were devastated, wheat and corn lying flat on the ground, fences broken, orchards ruined; here and there were pools of blood. The villages were deserted and bore the scars left by musket shots, bombs, rockets, grenades and shells. Walls were broken down and pierced with gaps where cannonballs had crushed through them. Houses were riddled with holes, shattered and ruined, and their inhabitants, who had been in hiding, crouching in cellars without light or food for nearly twenty hours, were beginning to crawl out, looking stunned by the terrors they had endured. All around Solferino, and especially in the village cemetery, the ground was littered with guns, knapsacks, cartridge-boxes, mess tins, helmets, shakoes, fatigue-caps, belts, equipment of every kind, remnants of blood-stained clothing and piles of broken weapons.
The poor wounded men that were being picked up all day long were ghastly pale and exhausted. Some, who had been the most badly hurt, had a stupefied look as though they could not grasp what was said to them; they stared at one out of haggard eyes, but their apparent prostration did not prevent them from feeling their pain. Others were anxious and excited by nervous strain and shaken by spasmodic trembling. Some, who had gaping wounds already beginning to show infection, were almost crazed with suffering. They begged to be put out of their misery, and writhed with faces distorted in the grip of the deathstruggle.... Oh, the agony and suffering during those days, the twentyfifth, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh of June! 2 ' Dunant joined members of local communities in an effort to tend to the wounded and bury the dead. 22 His account of the days that followed record extraordinary acts of compassion and an abundance of pain and suffering. His observations formed the basis for his later thoughts on ways to mitigate the effects of warfare. Dunant wrote:
If there had been enough assistance to collect the wounded in the plains of Medola and from the bottom of the ravines of San Martino, on the sharp slopes of Mount Fontana, or on the low 21 Id. at 41, 44, 60. 22 See generally id. at 122-23 (discussing Dunant's care for the wounded following battle). hills above Solferino, how different things would have been! There would have been none of those long hours of waiting on June 24, hours of poignant anguish and bitter helplessness, during which those poor men of the Bersagliere, Uhlans and Zouaves struggled to rise, despite their fearful pain, and beckoned vainly for a letter to be brought over to them, and there would never have been the terrible possibility of what only too probably happened the next day-living men being buried among the dead! If there had been available for the wounded improved means of transportation better than those now existing, there would have been no need for the painful amputation that one Light Infantryman of the Guard had to undergo at Brescia. The need for that operation arose from deplorable lack of attention when he was being carried from the regimental flying ambulance to Castiglione. If this man did not die under the operation, as many soldiers did, he could thank his own strong and healthy constitution for it. 23 Dunant proposed the creation of groups of civilian volunteers-formed in times of peace and recognized as neutrals by the belligerents when called to action in times of wardedicated to attending to the sick and wounded on the battlefield.
If an international relief society had existed at the time of Solferino, and if there had been volunteer helpers at Castiglione on June 24, 25 and 26, or at Brescia at about the same time, as well as at Mantua or Verona, what endless good they could have done! .... Humanity and civilization call imperiously for such an organization as is here suggested. It seems as if the matter is one of actual duty, and that in carrying it out the cooperation of every man of influence, and the good wishes at least of every decent person can be relied upon with assurance. Is there in the world a prince or a monarch who would decline to support the proposed societies, happy to be able to give full assurance to his soldiers that they will be at once properly cared for if they should be wounded? Is there any Government that would hesitate to give its patronage to a group endeavoring in this manner to preserve the lives of useful citizens, for assuredly the soldier who receives a bullet in the defense of his country Dunant's account of the Battle of Solferino and its brutal aftermath, and his suggestions on ways to alleviate suffering caused by war, led to a conference held in Geneva in 1863 that gave birth to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and, a year later, the first of what would be several Geneva Conventions.
25
Because of his contributions to achieving the ideals Alfred Nobel described of peace and a fraternity among nations, Henry Dunant was the recipient of the first Nobel Peace Prize awarded in December 1901.26
C. The Heart ofInternational Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law is rooted in the desire to limit the destructive effects of armed conflict. One of its most fundamental principles is the requirement for distinction between participants in the conflict and those entitled to protection from its harm. 28 For example, the First Geneva Convention which Dunant helped to enact in 1864 required the armed forces of the signatories to honor the neutrality of medical personnel, chaplains, ambulances and hospitals. There were no comprehensive protections afforded civilians by treaty or convention prior to World War II since it was "a cardinal principle of the law of war that military operations must be confined to the armed forces and that the civilian population must 24 Id. at 120-21, 126-27. 25 
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Vol. XXXIX enjoy complete immunity." 30 The duty to protect civilians did not need to be expressly prescribed because it was so universally understood that the "principle went without saying." 3 1 The desire to create a line separating the participants from the protected was a heightened concern after World War II; a time when concentration camps, mass executions, the indiscriminate bombings of cities, and the destructive power of nuclear weapons were still fresh in the minds of civilized countries desiring to mitigate suffering and harm in future armed conflicts. Geneva II addressed basically the same rules, although it applied to members of the armed forces at sea. Geneva III spelled out the requirements for the treatment of prisoners of war.
6 Geneva IV, entitled "Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War," was directed specifically at the special protections to be afforded civilian populations and civilian property during armed conflicts. 34 See Geneva 1, supra note 33. 35 See Geneva 11, supra note 33. 36 See Geneva III, supra note 33. 37 See Geneva IV, supra note 33.
The one article that is set out in all four of the conventions is Common Article 3, which states in pertinent part:
Article 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
3 8
Geneva IV is the most comprehensive of the four conventions (with rules set out in 159 articles and three annexes).
39
The commentary to Geneva IV provides: "In former times the need to protect the civilian population in wartime was not felt to the same degree as since the more recent wars.
Military operations nowadays-particularly bombing from the air-threaten the whole population."o 38 See Geneva I, supra note 33; Geneva II, supra note 33; Geneva III, supra note 33; Geneva IV, supra note 33. 39 See Geneva IV, supra note 33; see generally Geneva I, supra note 33; Geneva II, supra note 33; Geneva III, supra note 33 (setting out rules in 159 articles and three annexes). 40 UHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 118.
History had proven illusory Alfred Nobel's vision of advanced weaponry so destructive that it would act as a restraint on the will to resort to war, thereby reducing the damage armed conflicts caused. 4 ' Where before the impact of war was generally confined to the combatants and the field of combat, every advance in technology-from sword, to bow, to musket, to missile-extended the reach of war's destructive capabilities and broadened the scope of those subject to its harmful effects.
42
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were intended to ensure that everyone associated with an armed conflict was covered by some specific status that conveyed defined rights and responsibilities. civilians in belligerent and occupied territories. The generally unsatisfactory stopgap measure of attempting to apply the prisoners-of-war convention to certain categories of civilians during World War II had pointed up the need for a separate treaty establishing humane standards of treatment for civilians in time of war.
The United States had from the beginning actively supported the initiative taken in the fall of 1945 by the International Committee of the Red Cross to revise the existing conventions and to formulate a new civilian convention before the experiences of World War II had been forgotten. 45 The Senate authorized ratification on July 6, 1955, with all the members present for the roll call vote casting their votes for approval. President Dwight D. Eisenhower-the former General of the Army who served as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in World War II-ratified the conventions on July 14,
1955.46
After World War II, the frequency of international armed conflicts declined from an average of more than six per year to less than one, and the number of battlefield deaths declined from 20,000 per year to less than 6,000.47 While those numbers suggest a positive downward trend, not all of the numbers are as encouraging. In World War I, for example, fourteen percent of all Now, almost a century later, armed conflicts produce about ten civilian deaths for every one combatant that is killed. 49 The data suggest that the effort to limit the effects of armed conflict to the combatants on the battlefield and to protect civilian populations has not been successful. Nonetheless, the belief in the underlying civilian protection principle has not dissipated."o Researchers from the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1999-2000 concluded:
Yet the more these conflicts have degenerated into wars on civilians, the more people have reacted by reaffirming the norms, traditions, conventions and rules that seek to create a barrier between those who carry arms into battle and the civilian population. In the face of unending violence, these populations have not abandoned their principles nor forsaken their traditions. Large majorities in every war-tom country reject attacks on civilians in general and a wide range of actions that by design or default could harm the innocent. The experience has heightened consciousness of what is right and wrong in war. People in battle zones across the globe are looking to forces in civil society, their own state institutions, and international organizations to assert themselves and impose limits that will protect civilians. Earning and maintaining that reputation paid dividends. In the Gulf War in 1991, for example, the United States dropped leaflets encouraging Iraqi soldiers to surrender and providing instructions on how to do so safely.
5 4 Consequently, more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers deserted or surrendered, enabling the ground war to come to a quick end with minimal casualties for the United States and its coalition partners. About ninety-eight percent of Iraqi soldiers said they saw the leaflets, eighty-eight percent believed the message, and seventy percent cited it as a reason for deciding to put down their weapons and surrender." From a military perspective, having enemy troops lay down their weapons and raise their hands in surrender is far preferable to the soldiers digging in and fighting.
From a national interest perspective, ending an armed conflict quickly reduces costs and facilitates the return to peace. 6 Despite the important leadership role the United States played in the development of international humanitarian law after World War II, it has at times opted not to approve agreements most other countries supported, including many adopted by traditional U.S. our allies and friends an unacceptable and thoroughly distasteful price for joining a convention drawn to advance the laws of war. In fact, we must not, and need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.
58
The United States joined with countries whom many consider to be among the international humanitarian law rouges' galleryChina, Libya, Iraq, Israel, Qatar, and Yemen-in voting against the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court. 59 The United States and Somalia are the only two countries that have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
6 0 The United States-along with China, Pakistan and Russia-has not signed the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines. Advocating for the necessity of respect for human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law, while opting to avoid the limitations of major international humanitarian initiatives, creates an appearance that the United States is better at preaching than it is at practicing. The Geneva Conventions are another long step forward toward mitigating the severities of war on its helpless victims. They reflect enlightened practices as carried out by the United States and other civilized countries and they represent largely what the United States would do whether or not a party to the Conventions. Our own conduct has served to establish higher standards and we can only benefit by having them incorporated in a stronger body of conventional wartime law.. .. We feel that ratification of the Conventions now before you would be fully in the interest of the United States. 6 3 Deputy Secretary Murphy's statement reflects the still popular notion that the United States is a shining light for other countries to follow. It conveys a sense that while the conventions were necessary to lift others up to the American standard, the conduct of the United States already lived up to the "enlightened practices" that were reduced to writing in Geneva. Congress did nothing for forty years to enact a domestic means of enforcement for the Geneva Conventions' prohibitions. North Carolina Congressman Walter Jones introduced the War Crimes Act in 1995 to fill the void that followed the ratification of the conventions. 5 He wanted to ensure that Americans who were victims of war crimes had the opportunity to pursue justice. At a hearing in June 1996 before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman Jones said:
The bill is simple and straightforward. This legislation before you today will give the United States the legal authority to prosecute individuals who have committed a war crimes act against an American citizen. The bill restores justice by filling the gaps in federal criminal law relating to the prosecution of individuals for grave breaches of the Geneva Convention. When passed, the United States will no longer be a safe haven for anyone having committed such crimes. The bill before the subcommittee is particularly important to the men and women in the armed services. As a member of the House National Security Committee, I was astonished to learn that currently there is no law that provides the means for prosecuting unspeakable crimes committed by foreign nationals against our U.S. service personnel.
While the Geneva Convention of 1949 provides the United States with the authority, we have not yet passed legislation to provide the courts with the enforcement mechanism. This gap in the federal law is unacceptable. Representative Jones was motivated to propose legislation in large part by the story of Michael Cronin who spent six years in the "Hanoi Hilton" as a prisoner of war after being shot down during the Vietnam War.
67
Mr. Cronin returned home to the United States, earned a law degree, and worked to get legislation passed to create an enforcement mechanism for the Geneva Conventions. Testifying alongside Representative Jones at the subcommittee hearing, Mr. Cronin said:
I believe this is important legislation and I have personal experience to bear this out. Our opponents in the field have consistently denied Americans the benefits of the Geneva Bush's administration saw an opening created by the fear that followed the 9/11 attacks and seized upon it to radically expand executive branch power-particularly the power of the President himself-and in many respects undermined the basis for international humanitarian law championed by the United States after World War I. 74 Columnist Andrew Sullivan described the transformation of America after 9/11 in a Newsweek article published in September 2011:
As mysterious envelopes containing anthrax began to appear in mailboxes, as our airports shut down and reopened as police states, as terror-advisory color codes were produced, as the vast new bureaucratic behemoth of the Department of Homeland Security was set up, as a system of torture prisons (beginning with Guantinamo Bay) was constructed ... many concluded the threat must be grave enough to justify shredding some of the Constitution's noblest principles and precedents. This handful of [Islamic] fanatics was supposedly a greater threat than the Nazis and the Soviets. And so much of our inherited moral wisdom-such as the absolute stricture against torture and the ideal of habeas corpus-were tossed aside. Dick Cheney, the man elected vice president as a calming father figure, became the most terrified of them all. And so we joined him in fearing that Al Qaeda was on the cusp of arming itself with WMDs that could be used to end our civilization. If John McCain wants to follow George Bush with more tough talk and bad strategy, that is his choice-but that is not the change we need.
We are the party of Roosevelt. We are the party of Kennedy. So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country. Don't tell me that Democrats won't keep us safe. The BushMcCain foreign policy has squandered the legacy that generations of Americans-Democrats and Republicans-have built, and we are here to restore that legacy.
As Commander-in-Chief, I will never hesitate to defend this nation, but I will only send our troops into harm's way with a clear mission and a sacred commitment to give them the equipment they need in battle and the care and benefits they deserve when they come home.
I will end this war in Iraq responsibly and finish the fight against Al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. I will rebuild our military to meet future conflicts. But I will also renew the tough, direct diplomacy that can prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and curb Russian aggression. I will build new partnerships to defeat the threats of the twenty-first century: terrorism and nuclear proliferation; poverty and genocide; climate change and disease. And I will restore our moral standing so that America is once again that last, best hope for all who are called to the cause of freedom, who long for lives of 76 peace, and who yearn for a better future. It appeared Obama intended to make good on his lofty campaign rhetoric and begin restoring America's moral standing once he was sworn in as president. On his second day in office, he signed an executive order directing a review of each detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, suspending military commissions, and mandating the closure of the detention facility not later than speech at the National Archives-the home, as Obama noted, of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights-on changing course on national security and returning to American values: I've studied the Constitution as a student, I've taught it as a teacher, I've been bound by it as a lawyer and a legislator. I took an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen, I know that we must never, ever, turn our back on its enduring principles for expedience sake. I make this claim not simply as a matter of idealism. We uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is right, but because it strengthens our country and it keeps us safe. Time and again, our values have been our best national security asset-in war and peace; in times of ease and in eras of upheaval....
Unfortunately, faced with an uncertain threat, our government made a series of hasty decisions. I believe that many of these decisions were motivated by a sincere desire to protect the American people. But I also believe that all too often our government made decisions based on fear rather than foresight; that all too often our Government trimmed facts and evidence to fit ideological predispositions.
Instead of strategically applying our power and our principles, too often we set those principles aside as luxuries that we could no longer afford. And during this season of fear, too many of usDemocrats and Republicans, politicians, journalists, and citizens-fell silent.
In other words, we went off course. Republican presidential candidate, pledged that if he was elected, he would take an even more radical national security approach than President Obama and restore some of the most extreme Bushera practices that Obama banned."
While the future course of America's national security policy is unclear, one thing that is certain is that many of its post-9/1 1 practices have eroded the most fundamental objective of international humanitarian law: distinguishing civilians from combatants in order to mitigate the effects of armed conflicts on civilians."' There are numerous examples that illustrate the point. privileges, scrip (i.e., advances of monthly pay), athletic uniforms and scientific instruments.83 The Geneva Conventions were supposed to create a binding set of legal obligations regulating the conduct of their signatories during armed conflicts. They were supposed to prescribe the status of every person in and around an armed conflict and carry specific rights and responsibilities for each status. Treating the conventions as historical relics that the leader of a nation can dismiss at his or her leisure dilutes any authority they may have to compel military powers to operate within their bounds.
Labeling the Geneva Conventions
Creating a New Status to Which No Laws Apply
Not only did the Bush Administration decide that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, it also decided that members of those forces and their supporters had no legal rights if captured, except for whatever rights the President alone afforded them as a matter of grace.
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Deputy Attorney General John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert Delahunty prepared a memorandum for Department of Defense General Counsel Jim Haynes on January 2, 2002, expressing their legal opinion that the only rights that applied were those the President extended at his discretion. For example, they wrote:
To say that the specific provisions of the Geneva and Hague Conventions do not apply in the current conflict with the Taliban militia as a legal requirement is by no means to say that the principles of the laws of armed conflict cannot be applied as a matter of U.S. Government policy.
The President as
Commander-in-Chief can determine as a matter of his judgment for the efficient prosecution of the military campaign that the policy of the United States will be to enforce customary standards of the law of war against the Taliban and to punish 86 As he explained, "Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm-ushered in not by us, but by terrorists-requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva." detainees. 89 In 2008, the Court held that even though Congress expressly revoked federal court jurisdiction to hear detainee cases brought under the habeas statute in response to the Court's 2004 decision, detainees nonetheless had a constitutional right of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention. 90 Despite the claims that a President has virtually limitless and unchecked authority to act in matters involving national security, the Supreme Court has made it clear that all three branches of government have a role to play and that "a state of war is not a blank check for the President." In May 2012, the International Criminal Court at The Hague sentenced Charles Taylor to fifty years in prison for aiding and abetting war crimes committed in Sierra Leone. 98 Charles Taylor supplied weapons to the rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in exchange for blood diamonds. The RUF abducted children and turned them into child soldiers, forced women into sexual slavery, and mutilated or murdered many others during more than a decade of civil war. 99 Taylor's case marked the first war crimes conviction and sentence of a former head of state by an international war crimes tribunal. 100 The United States does not have an enviable record when it comes to torture committed on its behalf. In the wake of the We conclude that for an act to constitute torture as defined in §2340 [the torture provision of the U.S.
Criminal Code], it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent to intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under §2340, it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years. We conclude that the mental harm also must result from one of the predicate acts listed in the statute, namely: threats of imminent death; threats of infliction of the kind of pain that would amount to physical torture; infliction of such physical pain as a means of psychological torture; use of drugs or other procedures designed to deeply disrupt the senses, or fundamentally alter an individual's personality; or threatening to do any of these things to a third party. The legislative history simply reveals that Congress intended for the statute's definition to track the Convention's definition of torture and the reservations, understandings, and declarations that the United States submitted with its ratification. We conclude that the statute, taken as a whole, makes plain that it prohibits only extreme acts.102 In addition to sanctioning extreme standards for permissible interrogation methods-anything short of the pain caused by death or organ failure-Bybee also provided legal cover in the event the Even if an interrogation method arguably were to violate §2340A, the statute would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the President's constitutional power to conduct a military campaign. As Commander-inChief, the President has the constitutional authority to order interrogations of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information concerning the military plans of the enemy. The demands of the Commander-in-Chief power are especially pronounced in the middle of a war in which the nation has already suffered a direct attack. In such a case, the information gained from interrogations may prevent future attacks by foreign enemies. Any effort to apply §2340A in a manner that interferes with the President's direction of such core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants thus would be unconstitutional.... [T] he President enjoys complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority and in conducting operations against hostile forces.1 04 Given the extreme threshold the Bybee memorandum set for acts constituting torture and the legal shield it provided for violations, ' Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, based on the legal advice of his general counsel, William J. Haynes, III, signed a memorandum authorizing harsh interrogation techniques that included: stress positions, forced standing for up to four hours, depravation of light and sound, hooding, removing all of the detainee's clothing, shaving the detainee's facial hair, playing on phobias such as a fear of dogs, threats of harm to the detainee or his family, temperature extremes, dietary manipulation, slapping and poking, and waterboarding. Rumsfeld wrote on the memorandum, "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?" Id. The treatment Mohammed al-Qahtani experienced was not unique. The CIA acknowledged waterboarding three high-value detainees held in secret sites outside the United States."' Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, was waterboarded a reported 183 times." [W]e need to focus on the future. I recognize that many still have a strong desire to focus on the past. When it comes to actions of the last eight years, passions are high. Some Americans are angry; others want to re-fight debates that have been settled, in some cases debates that they have lost. I know that these debates lead directly, in some cases, to a call for a fuller accounting, perhaps through an independent commission. I've opposed the creation of such a commission because I believe that our existing democratic institutions are strong enough to deliver accountability. The Congress can review abuses of our values, and there are ongoing inquiries by the Congress into matters like enhanced interrogation techniques. The Department of Justice and our courts can work through and punish any violations of our laws or miscarriages of justice."' Attorney General Eric Holder announced in June 2011 that an investigation into about 100 cases of potential abuse of detainees while in CIA custody was closed and that only two cases where detainees died while in custody would be pursued with a view towards potential prosecution. Department of Defense announced in July 2013 that it would begin parole-style hearings for seventy-one detainees, including forty-six that had been categorized as indefinite detainees because at the time they were deemed too dangerous to release but not subject to prosecution and twenty-five detainees previously considered candidates for prosecution.' 30 The first review board hearing was conducted on November 20, 2013, with detainee Mahmud al Mujahid appearing by video teleconference from Guantanamo before the board convened in Washington, D.C.' 1 It is uncertain whether the current round of reviews will prove any more beneficial to detainees than the one completed in 2010 that found fifty-five detainees eligible for transfer out of Guantanamo, although few have been released to date.
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The Supreme Court said in June 2008 that Guantanamo detainees have the right to challenge the basis for their detention in federal court. The Court has an obligation to assure that those seeking to challenge their Executive detention by petitioning for habeas relief have adequate, effective and meaningful access to the courts. In the case of Guantanamo detainees, access to the courts means nothing without access to counsel. And it is undisputed that petitioners here have a continuing right to seek habeas relief. It follows that petitioners have an ongoing right to access the courts and, necessarily, to consult with counsel. Therefore, the Government's attempt to supersede the Court's authority is an illegitimate exercise of Executive power. The Court, whose duty it is to secure an individual's liberty from unauthorized and illegal Executive confinement, cannot now tell a prisoner that he must beg leave of the Executive's grace before the Court will involve itself. This very notion offends the separation-of-powers principles and our constitutional scheme.141
While Chief Judge Lamberth's ruling offered a glimmer of hope that the judicial branch still had some role to play in the cases of the Guantanamo detainees that will not face trial or transfer to another country, the prospect of any meaningful judicial intervention remains unlikely. Lamberth's former colleague, retired District Court Judge James Robertson, said in July 2012 at a symposium marking the fourth anniversary of the Supreme Court's Boumediene decision that the D.C. Circuit has "gutted" the decision and "taken the capital 'M' off of the word 'meaningful"' in "meaningful review."
He noted that not a single detainee has been released as a direct result of a court's habeas order, but he was cautiously optimistic about the future: "Some court, some day is going to find that the government can't hold these people for the rest of their lives."' The court said that "the Constitution allows detention of enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities," although it acknowledged Ali's argument that he could face "lifetime detention" without charge or trial.' 45 Judge Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the court, said absent statutory authorization, "it is not the Judiciary's proper role to devise a novel detention standard that varies with the length of detention. The only question before us is whether the President has authority under the AUMF to detain Ali." 46 The reliance on the wartime authority to detain the enemy for 141 Id. at 28. the duration of the conflict presents a conundrum for the Obama administration. In his State of the Union address in February 2013, President Obama said, "by the end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over." 47 With the end of the war likely comes the end of the authority to detain enemy combatants held because of their connection to the conflict. It also triggers the obligation set out in Geneva Convention III to release and repatriate detainees "without delay." 48 The end of the war in Afghanistan may hold the best hope for the men who have been detained at Guantanamo, in some cases for more than a dozen years, with no end in sight.' 4 9
B. Extrajudicial Assassination and Drone Strikes
Unmanned aerial vehicles-UAVs in military vernacular, or as they are commonly referred to by the public, drones-have been in use from the start of the global war on terrorism. "o Their use has, however, increased dramatically since President Obama took office in January 2009.'"' Not only has Obama used drone strikes more frequently than Bush, he has also used them in more places, in some instances launching strikes far removed from where most people envision the battlefield.'
52
There are scores of issues related to the use of drones, each one worthy of in-depth analysis, but particularly relevant to the erosion of the distinction between civilians and combatants is the unilateral power of the President to authorize killing almost anyone, almost anywhere, at virtually any time, and the legal authority for the CIA to kill when it is a civilian agency that does not enjoy combatant immunity.' The longest running and most extensive program by far is the one focused on militants in the tribal region of Pakistan.'"' The New America Foundation has documented U.S. drone strikes conducted inside Pakistan from the first one authorized by President Bush in 2004 to the latest in 2013.116 They report that drone strikes in the country peaked in 2010 when there were 122 strikes-one every three days-that killed between 609 and 1,027 people.1 5 7 Their data show that, over time, the United States has gotten increasingly better at killing suspected militants and not civilians, but still they estimate that the number of militants killed accounts for about eighty-one percent of the 2,847 people confirmed killed in drone strikes.' In 2013, militants were ninety-five percent of the confirmed killed.1 5 9 Peter Bergen, the Director of the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation and CNN's national security analyst, said that civilians and unknown casualties account for about eleven percent of those killed during President Obama's administration and about thirty-three percent during President Bush's tenure in office. 160 As a result of the U.S. drone campaign, Pakistani civilians in the tribal regions are afraid to congregate in groups for even social gatherings and three-fourths consider the United States an enemy of Pakistan. 6 ' The Obama administration's drone program differs from the Bush administration's approach not just in frequency but also in scope. Under Bush, drone strikes were directed at specific individuals believed to be high-value leaders in terrorist organizations. Under Obama, strikes have been directed in some instances at unidentified individuals engaged in activities with characteristics suggesting they are terrorism related.1 62 The former are known as "personality strikes" and the latter as "signature strikes."
63 Some joke that the criteria for "signature strikes" are so lax that "three guys doing jumping jacks" could be construed as a terrorist training camp, while others worry that men loading a truck with fertilizer could be deemed bomb makers subject to attack, when perhaps they were just farmers. These strikes foment anti-American outrage among the local population, question the legitimacy of the host-nation government, and provide the impetus for some who otherwise would not have taken part in militant activities to do so in reprisal for an attack.1 6 7
Additionally, the United States has two drone programs, one operated by the military and the other by the CIA. 6 6 The militaryrun program is governed by the law of war, but the CIA is a civilian agency that is not under military command and control, and is not bound by the law of war.1 69 CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston told an audience at Harvard Law School in April 2012 that they act "in a manner consistent with the four basic principles in the law of armed conflict governing the use of force," but a commitment to act consistent with those laws is not the same as being bound by them.' A civilian agency controlled and operated paramilitary drone program has been the subject of significant criticism. United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, noted in his 2010 study on targeted killing that lethal drone strikes carried out by CIA personnel could subject the civilian operators to prosecution for murder under U.S. domestic law or the law of the country where the strike took place, or war crime charges if the target was not directly participating in hostilities at the time of the strike. ' The legal confusion that results from having civilians involved in lethal combat operations was apparent in the military commission of Omar Khadr at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Khadr was charged with murder in violation of the law of war for throwing a grenade that killed a U.S. service member during a firefight in Afghanistan.'
74 Khadr was not in uniform, and he was not serving as part of an armed force or militia. Accordingly, he did not qualify for combatant immunity, which shields those acting in compliance with the law of war from criminal responsibility for the deliberate killing of another person. ' The U.S. Government had to amend its definition of murder in violation of the law of war shortly before Khadr's trial began when it realized that defining the offense to include someone who was not in uniform and who therefore did not meet the requirements of international humanitarian law to qualify as a lawful combatant could apply to CIA drone operators.1 hill."'"' The question is: does America shine as a guiding light or as a warning light?
Since 9/11, the United States has disparaged and disregarded international agreements it helped to create, crafted novel legal arguments in an effort to avoid application of laws it found inconvenient, redefined terms to fit its own purposes, and hid behind a curtain of secrecy whenever anyone challenged it.'1 2 Large numbers of Americans, both Democrats and Republicans, embrace the notion of virtually limitless presidential power: the Commander-in-Chief can ignore any law, foreign or domestic, that impedes what he or she alone decides is necessary in the interest of national security; he or she can detain and torture anyone suspected of being a threat; and if capture may prove difficult, he or she can order a civilian agency to hunt the suspect down and kill him. Are those the kinds of values America should hold up as examples to the world?
In a speech on national security policy at the National Defense University in May 2013, President Obama said:
From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions that we are making now will define the type of nationand world-that we leave to our children. So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison's warning that "[njo nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do-what we must do-is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. And to define that strategy, we have to make decisions based not on fear, but on hard-earned wisdom. If the period since 9/11 reflects how the United States views it obligations under international humanitarian law, then it should have the integrity to renounce the agreements it does not intend to honor. If, on the other hand, President Obama means what he says about America's values being the nation's strongest national security asset, he needs to lead the way and practice what he preaches. Erasing clear distinctions and replacing them with blurred lines undermines the foundation of the law of war. The road the United States chooses will determine if the foundation it spent decades helping to build is made of sandstone or granite.
University (May 23, 2013) , available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
